19 iunie 2010


Ce nu a spus videanul la conferinţa de presă, la întoarcerea din Rusia (articol din Georgian Daily):

Sublinierile cu roşu îmi aparţin.

Gazprom Seduces Romania With South Stream

June 19, 2010
Vladimir Socor

On June 16 in Moscow, Gazprom CEO, Aleksei Miller, and Romanian Economy Minister, Adriean Videanu, agreed on steps to bring Romania, instead of Bulgaria, into the South Stream project; and bring Gazprom into Romania’s energy sector.
Miller and Videanu agreed on the following steps (Interfax, June 16; Ziarul Financiar, June 17; Kommersant, June 17, 18):
  1. Prepare, until October 2010, the draft of an economic and technical feasibility study for building a section of the South Stream transit pipeline through Romania [instead of Bulgaria]; and provide Russia with all relevant data for a pipeline route, to be determined in Romania.
  2. Draft the feasibility study for an underground gas storage site, as part of the South Stream project in Romania; and separately, draft, also by October, a feasibility study for the long-discussed gas storage site at Margineni in Romania’s north-east.
  3. Create a joint company for gas exploration and production. This is believed to apply to state-controlled Romgaz company’s onshore and offshore fields; but might also be intended for a Romgaz concession in northern Iraq’s Kurdish-administered region, according to some Romanian media reports (Adevarul, June 18). Miller asked for Romanian investment commitments, and clearly identified gas buyers, as preconditions to creating an exploration and production venture with Romgaz. He showed a lack of interest in a 15 percent Romgaz minority stake, which Romania plans to float on the market (Agerpres, June 16).
Re-directing South Stream through Romania, instead of Bulgaria, would invalidate all the planning for South Stream since the project’s inception. The pipeline was supposed to run on the seabed of the Black Sea from Russia to Bulgaria; there to bifurcate, northwestward into Central Europe (bypassing Romania) and southwestward to Italy. The new version, just proposed, would run on the seabed from Russia to Romania, bypassing Bulgaria altogether. It would supposedly continue from Romania into Central Europe, and from there via Slovenia to Italy.

This stunning revision would also bypass the Russia-friendly countries of Serbia and Greece; unless Moscow agrees to lay a pipeline from Romania to Serbia and Croatia in order to reach Greece and Italy, after discarding the Bulgarian route. All these hypothetical possibilities remain unresolved. If so, there can be no question of Gazprom completing the feasibility studies for all the country sections of South Stream, and for the project in its entirety, by early 2011 as promised, let alone for a start on construction work.

Romania’s economy ministry has spearheaded an uneasy political decision in the Romanian government to explore an energy partnership with Russia. Minister Videanu has acted as the standard bearer of this policy since 2009, but it was unclear to what extent he enjoyed the backing of the Romanian president and government, themselves immersed in political infighting and electioneering. President, Traian Basescu, consistently a South Stream-skeptic until now, has not yet commented on Videanu’s June 16 agreements with Gazprom.

Gazprom had turned to Romania in the fall of 2009, after Bulgaria had suspended its participation in South Stream and other Russian energy projects, pending a review of their terms. Gazprom sought from that point onward to pressure or punish Bulgaria by preparing to re-direct South Stream through Romania. Amid general skepticism in Bucharest, a few nevertheless rose to this deceptive bait. Given the South Stream project’s lack of prospects, however, Gazprom’s leverage on Sofia through Bucharest seems equally unrealistic as Gazprom rewarding Romania for the policy shift.

The Bulgarian government confirmed those projects’ indefinite suspension in that country, in tones of finality, on June 11-13 (EDM, June 14). Videanu’s Moscow trip had already been scheduled by that time as a follow-up to his February talks with Gazprom Vice-Chairman, Aleksandr Medvedev, in Bucharest.
According to the Romanian Foreign Minister, Teodor Baconschi, the EU-backed Nabucco project remains Romania’s number one priority (Romania Libera, June 16). Other officials, however, hope to turn Romania into a European “hub” of energy transit projects: Nabucco, South Stream, AGRI, and more. “Thanks to the efforts of the Ministry of Economy, all [these] projects would run through Romania,” according to the minister himself (Agerpres, June 15). Such goals seem to take the South Stream bluff at face value and also to overlook the incompatibility (at this stage) between AGRI and Nabucco.

Bucharest’s move seems to “reset” its previous policy, which had sought to minimize dependence on Russian energy supplies or penetration of Romania’s energy sector by Russian monopolies. In passing, it also turns Bucharest into a Gazprom cudgel against Sofia. Moreover, it places Bucharest, alongside Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych’s, government in a new class of believers in South Stream: Bucharest from misplaced hope, Kyiv from equally misplaced fear, given South Stream’s lack of gas resources and financing –and, now, the looming havoc in its planning.

Gazprom had offered to deliver a total of 63 billion cubic meters of gas through South Stream, without identifying gas production to meet any such commitments. It had estimated South Stream’s overall cost at nearly $30 billion, without identifying any source of funding. The company is now radically changing the project’s geography, if Gazprom’s proposals to Romania can be taken seriously at all.

Source: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/

10 comentarii :

Despina spunea...

Eu ma crucesc si sunt din ce in ce mai socata.
Am aruncat o privire pe un articol adus de tine tot azi pe NR dar ceva mai devreme"

" Foreign policy specialists from Berlin’s establishment are discussing possible advantages of dictatorial forms of government. According to the current issue of a leading German foreign policy review, some observers see the West as being currently in a “state of democratic fatigue with an erosion of democratic institutions.” Simultaneously there are “diverse discussions of dictatorial powers and measures” even if usually in terms of a temporary dictatorship."

Riddick spunea...

Bomba aia atomică era planificată pentru Berlin. Poate că nu-i timpul pierdut.

Despina spunea...

Cu siguranta au gresit destinatia !

Si vorba ta, istoric vorbind nici nu este timpul pierdut ....

Anonim spunea...

nu fitzi socatzi, nu tot ce scriu si ziarele noastre, este

se scriu la comandä, tendentzios si de multe ori f. departe de adevär.

desigur videanu , nu putea spune ceva, care nu se stie cum iese.
citesc de multe ori grozävii, de care nici nu mai auzi.

Riddick spunea...

Videanu "ştie ce iese", din moment ce au transpirat detaliile afacerii.

Sper să nu iasă, n-or fi nebuni bulgarii că au zis "niet".

Despina spunea...

Inteleg ca articolul a aparut inr-o publicatie georgiana..

Riddick spunea...

Da, iar Vladimir Socor a lucrat la Europa Liberă, secţia română, specializat pe spaţiul URSS şi basarabia (părinţii lui sunt din Basarabia, parcă).

El pune link la siteul The Jamestown Foundation, care are secţiunea Eurasia Daily Monitor:


Despina spunea...

Pe ce spune presa de la noi m-am obisnuit sa nu ma bazez.

Dar, faptul ca deja georgienii comenteaza m-a pus cel mai mult pe ganduri. Asta chiar ma ingrijoreaza.

Mie imi place Shaakashvili.
L-am auzit vorbind imediat dupa tragedia de la Smolensk

Riddick spunea...

Mă laşi, cu "dictatorul" ăla de Saakashvili ?! ;-)

Despina spunea...

:)))))) !

Citate din gândirea profundă a europeiştilor RO

Vlad Nistor, 2023 (cerând introducerea "anulării legale" a dreptului de veto al statelor-membre UE neconforme cu "linia"): "Consider că pentru a ajunge la maturitate ca actor geopolitic autentic, Uniunea Europeană trebuie să-și extindă instrumentarul de politică externă și să consolideze structura sa instituțională pe direcția relațiilor externe. Votul în unanimitate, de exemplu, limitează în mod clar capacitatea UE de reacție rapidă."


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