Let me remind you that the “War of 8.8.8” [The Georgian War began on August 8, 2008 –ed.], and the decisive events of the “Revolution of Dignity” [the Maidan coup –ed.] occurred at a time when V.V. Putin was outside Moscow (in China and at the Olympics in Sochi). In the first case, the effect was not achieved. In the second—the question for me is not so clear.Slavyangrad.org:
- Currently, Ukrainian troops have almost completed their concentration of forces for the planned offensive. In the areas selected as the direction of the main strike (to the south of Donetsk) their superiority over the opposing portions of the NAF [Novorossiya Armed Forces –ed.] is estimated at approximately five-fold. Under the cover of defence in depth, the UAF [Ukrainian Armed Forces –ed.] grouping has a pronouncedly offensive configuration.
- At the front, additional exploration of the PRs’ [People’s Republics –ed.] army positions is actively conducted by professional reconnaissance (presumably PMCs [Private Military Companies –ed.]). The number of drones and electronic warfare equipment used by the Ukro-Army is impressive. A considerable reserve of ammunition for all kinds of weapons is concentrated near the front.
- The power available to the UAF is sufficient to effect a defeat of the opposing People’s Militia corps within a week or two, while profound breakthroughs can already be effected in the first day of the attack, giving access to the rear communications.
- The offensive may be “general” in character (aiming at accessing the border with the Russian Federation all along the line and the subsequent complete destruction of republics), or limited, the aim of which might be the capture of the southern part of the DPR and of vital infrastructure, without which even partial economic autonomy of the Donbass would be impossible.
- A full-scale offensive should be expected before the autumn muddy season; thus there remains for the UAF not more than a month and a half before its commencement. And taking into account the need to not only start, but to finish the operation before the onset of the autumn muddy season, the time-frame for the offensive moves to September 20-25. If an offensive does not start before this specified time, it will be possible to predict with a high degree of probability the preservation of the status quo before the winter frosts.
- Nonetheless, although postponement of the operation is possible, it is unlikely, as the deteriorating economic and political situation for the Kiev junta does not guarantee their ability to re-assemble an equally powerful group for an attack six months later.
- The most suitable time for the attack (putting oneself in the enemy’s place) would appear to be Putin’s visit to New York for the UN General Assembly (20th of September)—so an effect can be achieved by the application of massive pressure on him by the so-called international community when it comes to adopting the strategic decision of whether to provide or not to provide military assistance—or the scale of any aid—to the PRs.
- Let me remind you that the “War of 8.8.8” [The Georgian War began on August 8, 2008 –ed.], and the decisive events of the “Revolution of Dignity” [the Maidan coup –ed.] occurred at a time when V.V. Putin was outside Moscow (in China and at the Olympics in Sochi). In the first case, the effect was not achieved. In the second—the question for me is not so clear.
Original: El Murid
Translated by Alya & Alan Bailey / Edited by @GBabeuf